

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10  
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L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02  
PA-01 DOE-11 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 /150 W  
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P 161257Z FEB 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6038  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 02407

CW MESSAGE NO. 29

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, CCD, US, UR  
SUBJECT: US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, SEVENTH  
ROUND, ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 13, 1978

1. SUMMARY. AT ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING, HELD FEBRUARY 13, SOVIET DEL HEAD GAVE LENGTHY STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO U.S. STATEMENTS AT PREVIOUS TWO PLENARY SESSIONS. HIS STATEMENT INDICATED THAT ON ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITION THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ARE RELATIVELY CLOSE IN MOST CASES. LIKHATCHEV ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON ISSUES RELATED TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION. HOWEVER. HE REITERATED SOVIET REJECTION OF U.S. PROPOSALS FOR DECLARATION OF FACILITIES AND FOR OBLIGATORY ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES AND STOCKS. HE APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO TAG THE U.S. PROPOSALS FOR OBLIGATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION AS THE PRINCIPAL REMAINING OBSTACLE TO A JOINT INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING WAS HELD MONDAY, FEBRUARY 13,  
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1978 AT THE SOVIET MISSION. AMBASSADOR LIKHATCHEV (SOVIET DEL HEAD) MADE AN EXTENSIVE STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE U.S. STATEMENTS MADE AT THE NINTH AND TENTH PLENARY MEETINGS. HIS REMARKS DEALT PRIMARILY WITH THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION, IRRITANTS, PRECURSORS, AND GENERAL APPROACHES TO VERIFICATION. DETAILS ARE GIVEN BELOW IN PARAS 6-9.

3. GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION. LIKHATCHEV BEGAN BY SUMMARIZING THE SOVIET POSITION CONCERNING THE "GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION". HIS OVERALL CONCLUSION WAS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION AND THAT SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLES I AND X ARE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND PRECISE TO PRECLUDE ANY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS. HE INDICATED THAT THERE IS A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WOULD BE THREE TYPES OF PERMITTED PURPOSES: I.E., NONHOSTILE CIVILIAN PURPOSES; NONHOSTILE MILITARY PURPOSES, IN PARTICULAR PROTECTIVE PURPOSES; AND MILITARY PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE. LIKHATCHEV ASSERTED THAT BOTH SIDES HAD ANALOGOUS POSITIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: (A) LETHAL, HARMFUL AND OTHER CHEMICAL AGENTS AND SUBSTANCES DESIGNED FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES WOULD BE PROHIBITED; (B) SUBSTANCES DESIGNED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO PROHIBITION; (C) THOSE QUANTITIES OF AGENTS ACTUALLY NEEDED FOR NONHOSTILE MILITARY PURPOSES WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED; AND (D) THE PROHIBITION WOULD NOT APPLY TO AGENTS DESIGNED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE.

4. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION. IN THE COURSE OF HIS REVIEW OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION, LIKHATCHEV NOTED SEVERAL CONFIDENTIAL

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PROBLEMS AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE U.S. POSITION ON SEVERAL POINTS:

A. LIKHATCHEV ASKED WHAT THE PREMISE IS FOR THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT SOME HARMFUL IRRITANTS, SUCH AS CHLORO-ACETOPHENONE (RIOT CONTROL AGENT CN), REMAIN OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION? WHAT PLACE WOULD SUCH HARMFUL IRRITANTS HAVE IN THE CONVENTION?

B. UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A CEILING ON CHEMICALS RETAINED FOR NONHOSTILE MILITARY PURPOSES, WOULD A STATE WITH A SMALL POPULATION HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETAIN AS MUCH AS A LARGE STATE? (LIKHATCHEV SAID THAT SUCH A "COMMON CEILING" COULD PROVIDE A LOOPHOLE SINCE THE NEEDS OF STATES WOULD DIFFER CONSIDERABLY).

C. LIKHATCHEV SAID THAT ARTICLE X REFERS ONLY TO CHEMICAL AGENTS AND THAT IT DOES NOT CONTAIN A SINGLE WORD ABOUT PERMITTING MEANS OF DELIVERY. HE AGREED THAT A PROBLEM EXISTS WITH REGARD TO CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, HOWEVER, SINCE CHEMICALS USED IN TROOP TRAINING MUST SOMEHOW BE DELIVERED AT THE SITE OF THE EXERCISE, (I.E., IN AMMUNITION,

DUMMY AMMUNITION, OR OTHER MEANS OF DISSEMINATION).  
NOTING THAT DIFFERENT STATES WOULD USE DIFFERENT METHODS  
OF TROOP TRAINING AND WOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO BE INTER-  
FERED WITH, HE RECOGNIZED THE CLEAR NEED TO PRECLUDE  
THE USE OF TROOP TRAINING FOR PERFECTING THE MEANS OF  
OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE.

D. LIKHATCHEV SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY,  
"COUNTER TO LOGIC", THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSES TO PROHIBIT  
THE USE OF SUPER-TOXIC CHEMICALS DESIGNED FOR MILITARY  
PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 02407

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5. IRRITANTS. LIKHATCHEV SAID THE SOVIETS COULD AGREE  
TO AN APPROACH UNDER WHICH "HARMFUL AGENTS," INCLUDING  
IRRITANTS, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO PROHIBITION ON THE BASIS  
OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION OR ON THE BASIS OF AN  
AGREED LEVEL OF TOXICITY. HE INDICATED THAT THIS  
APPEARED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION, BUT THAT  
THE NATURE OF THE TOXICITY CRITERION REQUIRES AGREEMENT.  
LIKHATCHEV RESERVED THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE U.S.  
PROPOSAL TO EXCLUDE RIOT CONTROL CHEMICALS FROM THE CON-  
VENTION. HE SAID THAT IN ORDER TO DEFINE THE SOVIET  
POSITION ON THIS QUESTION THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO KNOW  
IF THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION  
NOT TO PRODUCE RIOT CONTROL CHEMICALS "FOR PURPOSES OTHER  
THAN THOSE SPECIFIED BY THE U.S. DURING THE RATIFICATION  
OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925". LIKHATCHEV ALSO INQUIRED  
HOW ONE COULD PREVENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SUCH IRRI-

TANTS, IRRITANTS WHICH COULD BE DIVERTED FROM LEGITIMATE PURPOSES TO CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES.

6. PRECURSORS. IN LIKHATCHEV'S VIEW, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THIS ISSUE. HE SAID BOTH SIDES CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREED ON THE NEED TO PROHIBIT "INITIAL AND INTERMEDIATE SUBSTANCES" OF SUCH TYPES AND IN SUCH QUANTITIES AS ARE USED FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION. REFERRING TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DATA EXCHANGE BASED ON A LIST OF "IMPORTANT" PRECURSORS, HE SAID THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT VERIFICATION IN THIS AREA CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY EXCHANGING CERTAIN DATA BILATERALLY OR THROUGH THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. LIKHATCHEV STATED THAT THE SOVIETS AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO DRAWING UP LISTS INITIALLY BY U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS, OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PRECURSORS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TRYING TO DRAW UP AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF PRECURSORS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE AND COULD LEAD TO INTERFERENCE WITH THE CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. HE SAID THAT OTHER TASKS SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY NOW OVER ACTUALLY WORKING OUT THE LISTS, BUT THAT MEANWHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD PREPARE A REACTION TO THE U.S. DRAFT LISTS.

7. DECLARATION OF STOCKS. NOTING THE U.S. CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR DECLARATION OF STOCKS SIX MONTHS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, LIKHATCHEV SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A SHORTER PERIOD.

8. VERIFICATION. LIKHATCHEV OUTLINED WHAT HE SAW AS THE BASIS FOR THE DIFFERENCES ON VERIFICATION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED THAT "VERIFICATION IN A VOLUNTARY FRAMEWORK" FULLY MET THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE CW CONVENTION. HOWEVER, THE U.S. CONSIDERS SUCH VERIFICATION TO BE ONLY AN ADJUNCT TO OBLIGATORY INSPECTION. HE SUMMARIZED THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES BY SAYING THAT ONE SIDE FAVORS ON-SITE INSPECTION ONLY WHEN IT IS REALLY NECESSARY, WHILE THE OTHER SIDE WANTS ON-SITE INSPECTION CONFIDENTIAL

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EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO NEED FOR IT. HIS GENERAL CONCLUSION WAS THAT DECLARATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND OBLIGATORY INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, AS PROPOSED BY THE U.S., POSED A GREATER RISK TO THE SECURITY OF

STATES THAN DID THE POSSIBILITY OF NON-COMPLIANCE.  
HE REITERATED THAT THE SYSTEM PROPOSED BY THE USSR WOULD  
PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE AND WOULD NOT  
LEAD TO INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

9. LIKHATCHEV CONCLUDED BY CONTRASTING THE SOVIET  
CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE WITH THE U.S. APPROACH OF CONTINUING  
TO INSIST ON A NUMBER OF "COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE" VERI-  
FICATION PROVISIONS. HE CALLED UPON THE U.S. TO ADOPT A  
MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE SO THAT THE JOINT INITIATIVE  
COULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE CCD FOR REVIEW "EVEN BEFORE THE  
BEGINNING OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT".

10. AMB. FISHER (USDEL HEAD) SAID THE U.S. DELEGATION  
WOULD STUDY THE SOVIET STATEMENT AND RESPOND AT THE NEXT  
PLENARY MEETING. THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING WAS SUB-  
SEQUENTLY SCHEDULED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF TUESDAY,  
FEBRUARY 21. VANDEN HEUVEL

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## Message Attributes

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